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Introduction
Polarization(s) in Labour Markets
Bruno Ducoudré *, Véronique Simonnet**
Over the last two decades, researchers have paid a lot of attention to polarization in labour markets, that is to say the rise of high- and low-wage jobs relative 
to middle-wage jobs. The international conference on “Polarization(s) in Labour 
Markets”, organised by the Directorate for Research, Studies and Statistics (DARES, 
French Ministry of Labour) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), took 
place in Paris on June 19, 2018. The conference attempted to provide answers to a new 
set of questions on this subject: are there structural causes, other than technological 
change and the emergence of information and communication technologies (ICT), for 
the development of polarization? What about the reallocation of jobs in Europe and the 
United States when labour market institutions (minimum wage, taxation, etc.) pursue 
different objectives? How have routine activities declined? Who are the employees 
most affected by this decline and what are the consequences for them? Finally, what 
roles do international trade and firms play in the development of polarization and its 
geography?
Following this conference, the Editorial Board of Travail et Emploi has proposed 
to some of the participants to write an original paper bringing together the results of 
several of their most recent works, already published or in the course of publication. 
This issue therefore highlights recent research in economics on the subject of job 
polarization. First, it places the polarization phenomenon in the set of changes that 
labour markets have undergone since the 1950s. It then discusses the firms’ transforma-
tions and workers’ professional transitions in connection with the development of new 
technologies and international trade. This issue aims to take stock of the remaining 
issues that call for future developments in research on polarization.
* Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE), Sciences Po ; bruno.ducoudre@ofce.sciences-po.fr.
** Direction de l’animation de la recherche, des études et des statistiques (DARES), Mission animation de la recherche 
(MAR) ; veronique.simonnet@travail.gouv.fr.
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What is Polarization of the Labour Market?
At the beginning of the 2000s, researchers shed light on the phenomenon of 
polarization: the relative growth of wages and employment of high-wage occupations 
in the 1980s and 1990s and the relative growth of wages and employment of low-wage 
occupations compared to middle-wage occupations in the 1990s and the first decade of 
2000 (Autor, Dorn, 2013; Autor et al., 2006). This polarization is largely explained 
by the automation of routine tasks that disappear in favor of non-routine manual or 
cognitive tasks.
The study of the phenomenon originates from quantitative and case-study evi-
dence that document a striking correlation between the adoption of computer-based 
technologies and the increased use of college-educated labour (this correlation is 
frequently interpreted as skill biased technological change). Autor et al. (2003) show 
that the rapid adoption of computer technologies, spurred by sharp real price decline, 
leads to changes in the tasks performed by workers and, ultimately, in the demand 
for human skills. Computer capital substitutes workers in performing cognitive and 
manual tasks that can be accomplished according to an explicit set of rules –called 
“routine tasks”. Conversely, it complements workers in performing tasks that require 
flexibility, creativity, problem-solving skills, and complex communication activities– 
called “non-routine tasks.” As the price of computer capital falls, these two mechanisms 
(substitution and complementarity) raise relative demand for workers who have a 
comparative advantage in non-routine tasks, typically the more educated workers.
But Autor et al. (2003) show that the changing composition of job tasks spurred 
by technological change affects almost all occupations and educational levels. It thus 
appears before the rise in the general level of education and accounts for 60% of the 
estimated relative demand growth favouring college labour between 1970 and 1998 in 
the United States. Their model predicts also that industries that are initially intensive 
in labour inputs will invest the most in computers and new technologies as their prices 
decline, thus triggering a considerable reduction in routine activities and an increase in 
non-routine activities. These industries would reduce labour demand for routine tasks, 
for which computer capital substitutes, and increase labour demand for non-routine 
tasks, which computer capital complements.
Goos and MAnninG (2007) further specify that routine tasks that require 
precision and can be performed by machines (such as some accounting tasks, for 
example), are not necessarily those requiring the lowest skill levels. Conversely, some 
non-routine manual tasks that essentially involve coordination (such as shelving, 
or tasks performed in service occupations involving assisting or caring for others) 
require very little qualification. As a result, automation leads to increased demand 
for well-paying skilled jobs that typically require non-routine cognitive skills and 
increased demand for low-skilled, low-wage jobs that typically require non-routine 
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manual skills.1 In contrast, there is less demand for “intermediate” jobs that require 
routine manual and cognitive skills. This process leads to job polarization and by 
extension to wages polarization. If the most skilled workers generally perform non-
routine cognitive tasks and the least skilled workers perform manual non-routine 
tasks, employment polarization corresponds to an increase in jobs at both the top 
and the bottom of the wage distribution. The reduction of routine tasks, whether 
cognitive or manual, leads to a reduction in the share of jobs located in the middle 
of the distribution. One can thus observe polarization by looking at the evolution 
of employment per salary centile. By ranking and having a close look at the lowest 
paid occupations, the middle and the highest paid occupations, Goos et al. (2009, 
2014) confirm the polarization of employment in all European countries over the 
period 1993-2010.
Finally, Autor and Dorn (2013) suggest that the fall in the price of new tech-
nologies that drives down the wage paid to routine tasks leads some low-skilled 
workers to switch to service occupations that are difficult to automate because “they 
rely heavily on dexterity, flexible interpersonal communication, and direct physical 
proximity” (p. 1590).2 As in these sectors there is currently no substitutability between 
goods and services, the substitution of routine human tasks by machines in the pro-
duction of goods can allow a growth of wages and employment in low-skilled service 
occupations.3
Sources and Consequences of Polarization
The polarization of labour markets has raised a series of questions relating both 
to its origins, to the mechanisms at work and their consequences on occupational 
patterns and the wage distribution, to individual workers’ occupational mobility pat-
terns and wage trajectories and to the differentiated effects among social groups. In 
the first article of this issue of Travail et Emploi, Alan Manning addresses these 
questions, stating that polarization is a structural phenomenon prior to the diffusion 
of ICT. Zsófia Bárány and Christian Siegel demonstrate this point, explaining that 
the manufacturing share of employment began to decline as early as the 1960s, while 
services employment increased, and that wage differentials between services and 
manufacturing with equal skills increased. Since routine jobs are largely concentrated 
1. Non-routine manual tasks need “eye-hand-foot” coordination. Non-routine cognitive tasks include “control, 
planning and direction” tasks, which correspond to managerial and interactive tasks, and/or the need for mathematical 
and formal reasoning. Routine tasks are identified by the possibility to set “limits, tolerances and standards” and by 
“finger dexterity” practice (Goos, MAnninG, 2007).
2. Such as services related to transportation, accommodation and food, personal care, building and grounds cleaning, 
housekeeping, delivery and security services.
3. This requires a strong elasticity of substitution between routine tasks and new technologies, on the one hand, and a 
low elasticity of substitution between goods and services, on the other hand. The decline in the price of new technologies 
then benefits the development of non-routine-manual-skills intensive services.
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in manufacturing and located in the middle of the wage distribution, these reallocations 
have led to job polarization in the United States. This structural change has led to a 
reallocation of jobs between sectors and within sectors.
While the share of jobs requiring cognitive skills has grown across all sectors 
and the share of routine jobs has declined, half of the increase in manual employment 
has been due to the reallocation of employment between sectors –these employment 
reallocations evolving in accordance with the rate of diffusion of new technologies 
within the sectors and occupations. Zsófia Bárány and Christian Siegel show that the 
diffusion of new technologies within some occupations, and within some occupations 
in some sectors, is much faster than in any sector in general.
Alan Manning also points out the links between polarization and inequality, and 
the fact that structural changes in labour markets generate “winners” and “losers”. 
Polarization does not manifest itself so much as a massive rise in wage inequalities 
between occupations –the supply of work by occupation is very elastic to relative wages 
between jobs– but rather as differentiated impacts among individuals and social groups. 
Guido Matias Cortes shows that in the United States, polarization has resulted in a 
decline in manufacturing skilled workers’ jobs and middle-level administrative jobs. 
Thus, routine manual occupations have declined with the decrease in the proportion 
of men aged 20 to 50 without a diploma or with little education in the population, but 
even more so because of the decrease in men’s probability of working in routine manual 
occupations. Two thirds of the decline in routine cognitive activities come from the 
decline in the probability of women aged 20 to 50 with high school diplomas or some 
post-secondary education of working in routine cognitive activities. Both these declines 
in the probability of working in routine activities have resulted in a slight increase in non-
routine manual employment but above all in a strong growth in non-employment, which 
could partly explain the decline in men’s employment rate observed in the United States 
during this period. Women have experienced fewer transitions to non-employment than 
men but have not switched to non-routine cognitive occupations either. Guido Matias 
Cortes also shows that the wage growth of men remaining in routine occupations is much 
lower than that of men who have switched from routine to non-routine occupations, even 
though those non-routine occupations are low-skilled manual jobs.
Polarization is a global phenomenon since it affects all countries, regardless of 
their income level, and since it grows in parallel with globalization, the two phenomena 
appearing to feed on one another. Fredrik Heyman and Fredrik Sjöholm highlight the 
links observed in Sweden between labour market polarization and the degree of firms’ 
exposure to international competition. On the one hand, they show that multinational 
firms and exporting firms employ more highly-skilled workers than do local firms; 
on the other hand, global engagement impacts firm organization and the occupational 
structure of firms. Firms with a high initial level of routine jobs increase their share of 
high- and low-skilled jobs at the expense of routine, middle-skilled jobs. Technological 
change leading to a decline of routine jobs and to job polarization can improve firms’ 
competitiveness and support the development of their international activities. Increased 
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export shares skew the labour mix toward high-skilled occupations. Offshoring would 
help to increase both high-skilled and low-skilled occupations.
Finally, what is the overall impact of polarization on economies? Does it mean a 
rise or a fall in wages in the long term? Alan Manning provides answers by showing 
how technology can benefit workers on average over the long term, through a rise 
in average wages. This occurs when the capital stock varies in the long term, while 
the quantity of labour input available is limited, and the relative price of investment 
decreases in the long term. Under these conditions, productivity gains must benefit the 
compensation of employees as a whole, which would generate additional demand for 
goods and services that create jobs. This does not mean that there are only winners, 
since significant redistributive effects can occur simultaneously. With these results, 
Alan Manning invites us to think about the policies to implement so that gains from 
the diffusion of new technologies benefit the largest number as well as the instruments 
that can be mobilised: minimum wages, training policies, redistributive taxation.
This issue of Travail et Emploi does not claim to be exhaustive,4 since it does not 
deal with the role of labour market institutions in the development of polarization. A 
minimum wage can thus influence the evolution of the occupational pattern, and offset 
wage inequalities if its level is high enough. Training systems for people working in 
occupations affected by automation are also ways to support their career transitions. 
The links (or lack of links) between labour markets polarization in high-income coun-
tries and offshoring in low-income countries have to be clarified, especially because 
polarization in labour markets in low-income countries is not clearly established. 
According to MAloney, MolinA (2016), different reasons can explain this result. Let’s 
give three of them: compared to developed countries, the share of routine occupations 
is often less important in developing countries since employment in the primary sector 
is still important; routine occupations in developing countries can partly benefit from 
offshoring; investment in new technologies may also be lower. The phenomenon of 
polarization also seems to have a spatial dimension, since it can impact the structure of 
employment and wages of local labour markets differently. Autor (2019) shows how 
technological changes have affected low-educated urban workers by reducing their 
advantage in working in metropolitan areas because routine occupations have been 
reduced in these areas. Finally, recent developments in artificial intelligence, and its 
potential to replace workers to perform some highly-skilled tasks (for example the diag-
nosis of certain diseases) raise the question of its complementarity or substitutability with 
high-skilled workers, which could deeply modify the process of polarization (FrAnk et 
al., 2019). However, the effects of artificial intelligence development on productivity and 
employment may be slow to spread; both because the accumulation of capital stock based 
on this technology would take time to have macroeconomic effects, but also because its 
diffusion would require additional investments (BrynjolFsson et al., 2017). All these 
questions open up fundamental research perspectives for the years to come.
4. See DelAutre, siMonnet, 2018 for a more complete state of the works on polarization.
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